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ABSTRACT
During 1773 and 1774, residents of Charleston, South Carolina contested the 
importation of British tea by mariners and merchant consignees of the British East India 
Company. In three instances, crowd action allowed members of the community to 
express their opposition to what they perceived as British transgressions. Prominent 
among the protestors were the city’s artisans, who, along with other crowd participants, 
gained a measure of public authority by their actions. The artisans’ acquisition of this 
public voice was a substantial development for these mechanics, who had occupied a 
marginal socioeconomic niche in pre-Revo lutionary Charleston—a social world in which 
gentlemen viewed them with disdain and an economic one in which British imports and 
slave labor tore at the free artisan’s economic viability. Some artisans even gained 
membership on the various legislative committees that coordinated the city’s 
nonimportation actions and became Charleston’s de facto governing bodies in the 
immediate pre-war era. Offlceholding artisans, however, were predominantly men of 
wealth and import, while journeymen and less successful craftsmen remained without 
such definite political gain during the tea party era and subject to similar economic 
pressures long after the revolution. This study, then, seeks not only to chronicle the 
popular actions of the nonimportation era in Charleston, but also to gauge to what extent 
socioeconomic position within the artisan class defined the limits o f sociopolitical gain in 
the immediate pre-Revolutionary era.
CHARLESTON’S ARTISANS AND THEIR TEA PARTIES
Introduction
The splash of tea in Boston Harbor rippled eastward and brought Great Britain 
and her American colonies ever closer to war by late 1773. The East India Company had 
also sent merchant ships stocked with Bohea tea to Charleston, among other cities, but in 
South Carolina, no “Mohawks” destroyed Crown property. Instead, anxious magistrates 
hustled the tea ashore to the King’s stores before protestors could act. While the Crown 
enacted the Port Act to punish the recalcitrant Bostonians, a senior royal official reasoned 
that Charleston’s actions were “not equal in criminality to the Proceedings in other 
colonies.”1 And so it went, even in posterity: while Boston’s Mohawks still live “in song 
and glory,” those who gathered and mobbed in support of nonimportation at Charleston 
were forgotten, not only by popular culture, but also by historians. Most of Charleston’s 
overt clashes with English merchants and authorities over imported tea were non-violent; 
the only tea party mob allowed its intended victim to escape, and when the town did 
enforce its ban on tea, it was not rowdy “liberty boys” dressed as Indians who flung 
leaves of tea into the harbor, but rather East Indian Company consignees— and with little 
fanfare.
While the audacity o f the Boston Tea Party moved Whitehall to enact policy that 
hastened rebellion, Charleston’s three tea parties, occurring between November 1773 and
1 Great Britain. Public Records Office: Letter from Earl o f Dartmouth to Lieutenant Governor William 
Bull, February 5 ,1774, Records o f  the British Public Records Office Relating to South Carolina, 1663- 
1782, microfilm, reel 11.
2 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “A Ballad o f the Boston Tea Party,” in Samuel Francis Drake, ed., Tea Leaves: 
Being a Collection o f  Letters and Documents Relating to the Shipment o f  Tea to the American Colonies in 




December 1774, also initiated change—albeit of a more local nature—within the city’s 
sociopolitical power structure. Among the non-gentry groups who benefited from their 
involvement in these tea parties were Charleston’s artisans. Though it is difficult to 
gauge how much crowd participants—let alone artisans, specifically—benefited, many of 
those who made concrete political gains in the wake of the tea parties were in fact 
artisans, albeit wealthy ones. Most historians have devoted little attention to Charleston, 
the south’s largest seaport, preferring to relate the stories of tea parties in Newport or 
Boston. Events in Charleston, however, provide an opportunity for comparative study—  
to examine how protestors of different societies expressed similar political grievances in 
similar ways. Participation in the popular actions of the non-importation era—attending 
the denunciation of a Crown official, mobbing a transgressive merchant mariner, or 
witnessing an overt act o f contrition by an offender o f the community—first allowed for 
the emergence of a more consensual and community-wide form of public authority and, 
subsequently, led to the widening of the participatory dimensions of Charleston’s 
political sphere for some in the upper part of the artisan class. Thus, this subtle 
transformation of public and political authority entailed two-steps. Initially, protest 
allowed crowd participants of diverse socioeconomic stations a measure of public 
authority. Compared with the political circumstances that most endured (or accepted) in 
the pre-Revolutionary era, the “out of doors” nature of public authority adopted during 
the tea party era was exceptional. Years o f political underrepresentation, followed by a
3 A primary goal o f  this paper is to chronicle all three tea parties in one study. For separate accounts o f the 
various tea parties, see Marguerite Steedman, “Charlestown’s Forgotten Tea Party,” Georgia Review 21 
(Summer 1967), 244-259; Richard Walsh, Charleston’s Sons o f Liberty: A Study o f  the Artisans, 1763- 
1789 (Columbia, SC, 1959); Charles C. Rogers, Jr. “The Charleston Tea Party: The Significance o f  
December 3, 1773,” South Carolina Historical Magazine 75 (July 1974), 153-168; and Pauline Maier,
“The Charleston Mob and the Evolution o f Popular Politics in Revolutionary South Carolina, 1765-1784,” 
Perspectives in American History, 4 (1970), 173-196. The best narrative o f events in Boston remains 
Benjamin Woods Labaree, The Boston Tea Party (New York, 1964).
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complete lack of political representation, in the immediate pre-Revolutionary era made 
Charleston’s experiment with more popular government in 1773 and 1774 a substantial 
departure from historical precedent. If but for a fleeting moment, a very real (though 
perhaps not quite tangible) sense of empowerment came to the protestors in the street.
The second act of popular empowerment was a much more circumscribed (and 
quantifiable) dilation of the city’s political participatory sphere. The election of non­
gentry artisans to the de facto legislative committees that governed Charleston in the late 
pre-Revolutionary era gave, for the first time, a select few mechanics some political 
authority. Only affluent artisans, however, benefited from these later changes in 
Charleston’s political culture. The limits of public empowerment in Charleston, then, 
were at least partly the function of socioeconomic status. This study, accordingly, strives 
for something of a dual objective: in addition to gauging changes in political culture 
during the late colonial period, it describes the socioeconomic fissures within the artisan 
demographic of eighteenth-century Charleston that were critical determinants of who, 
exactly, could most benefit from the political upheaval of the era.
The sources that detail artisan actions in Charleston during the tea party era are 
scanty, and make the achievement of these goals somewhat elusive. Artisans’ presence 
in newspaper accounts of the era were limited to passing mentions of the “gentlemen of 
the schools,” and there are no sources that elucidated the plight of the Charleston artisan 
during the nonimportation era as clearly as George Hewes’ recollections did for artisans 
of Boston. The record is often fragmentary, and George Rude’s warning, that “faces” of
5
the crowd are difficult to elucidate, certainly holds true.4 But, through the use of all 
available sources: memoirs of wealthy observers, newspaper accounts, and—most 
germane to this study—relevant demographic information, an image—perhaps more a 
reflection than a portrait, but an image nonetheless—of the artisan, his actions during the 
nonimportation era, and his subsequent political gains, emerges.
Thus the conclusions subsequently offered here—while incorporating a fair 
amount of inference—are not products of guesswork. In Chapter One, using a blend of 
secondary and primary sources, I have attempted to describe the artisans’ niche in pre- 
Revolutionary Charleston. The main narrative of the tea parties, which constitutes the 
bulk of the second chapter, relies predominantly on accounts of the tea parties culled 
from both local and international newspapers. In the third and final chapter, however, the 
style and source base of the paper shift dramatically, from narrative to a prosopographic 
analysis of the select few artisans who attained political station in the pre-Revolutionary 
era. This blend of both narrative and demographic sources allows for not only a retelling 
of the tea party actions, but an at least preliminary analysis of their lasting effects on the 
artisans of Charleston.
The time, it seems, is ripe for an evaluation of these events. Indeed, none of the 
three Charleston tea parties fits seamlessly within the historiographical frameworks 
previously set forth by “consensus” or “conflict” historians. None of the popular actions 
of December 1773 or July and November of 1774 grew violent, and most participants 
seemed intent on achieving limited goals. But neither did those who attended public 
meetings en masse, threatened East India Company consignees, or pursued British
4 George Rude, The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and 
England, 1730-1848 (New York, 1964), 14.
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merchant captains down wharves and piers at night seem opposed to force. Furthermore, 
while in some instances Charlestonians’ support for the extralegal activities of the tea 
party era seemed to provide crowds and other organs of de facto authority with a popular 
mandate, in no way did these extralegal bodies have the unanimous support of city 
residents as “consensus” historians would argue. Nor, indeed, did conflict break neatly 
along class lines as other works would suggest. The study of these popular actions makes 
one chary of historiographic models. Nevertheless, a brief canvassing of historians’ work 
regarding popular action and, more specifically, the artisan role in the tea party actions of 
the Revolutionary era, provides valuable points of departure for comparisons between 
mobs in Charleston and other locales in British North America.
The study of eighteenth-century American crowds owes much to the pioneering 
efforts made by historians working outside the American context. Two scholars in 
particular set the terms of historiographic debate during their respective eras, one at the 
end of the nineteenth century through a pioneering study of the “mob,” and the other, 
writing more than fifty year later, by his groundbreaking work that has influenced 
historians of popular action ever since. Gustav Le Bon, in his 1895 publication The 
Crowd, described the “mob” as a mindless and brutal rabble of “automatons.” Without 
exception, mob rule was “tantamount to a barbarian phase”; the mob’s sole objective (and 
desire) being the wanton destruction of the rational and orderly. For Le Bon, mob 
participants “ceased to be guided by their wills” and exchanged “conscious personality” 
for the mindlessness of the crowd, where all members of the “servile flock” followed at 
the beck and call of a single, maniacal leader. Participation in mob activity required a 
complete forfeiture of individual rationality and acceptance of or indulgence in primitive
7
lawlessness. The mob was, in the terminology of the times, a decisive triumph for the 
collective I d 5
George Rude provided an effective counterbalance to Le Bon. Rude not only 
dismissed Le Bon’s theories as prejudiced but also leveled blame at the academic 
community in general, which, Rude insisted, had allowed crowd studies to become the 
exclusive domain of sociologists and psychologists. While he acknowledged that 
“identifying faces [in the crowd] was beset with obstacles,” Rude implored historians to 
make crowds the focus of historical studies. He also set forth his rebuttal to Le Bon and 
his “conservative” supporters by his own “liberal, humane, and democratic” 
interpretation of the crowd, one that eschewed the blanket characterization of the crowd 
as a mindless mob and viewed most popular activity as meaningful if base forms of 
political expression.6
Many Americanists incorporated Rude’s findings into their own interpretations of 
crowd action, but also endowed the crowds of revolutionary America with an orderliness 
and purpose that complicated extant historiography. So-called consensus scholars like 
Pauline Maier expanded on Rude’s attribution of ideology to the crowd and deemed mob 
action a “stage in the development of the popular organized politics of the nineteenth 
century.”7 Unlike Rude and Le Bon, who had never discounted the volatility and 
impulsiveness of the crowd in eighteenth-century Europe, Consensus scholars described 
many American pre-industrial crowds as pragmatic and of limited scope and purpose. 
Crowds became a political weapon of a watchful public, especially for members of 
society’s lower ranks who could rarely make their sentiments known through orthodox
5 Gustav Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study o f  the Popular Mind (New York, 1960) (reprint), 18, 32, 118.
6 Rude, The Crowd in History, (New York, 1964), 14.
7 Maier, “The Charleston Mob,” Perspectives 4 (1970), 173.
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channels of government. Scholars such as Gordon S. Wood dismissed the spontaneity of 
revolutionary crowds, a quality that even Rude—the father of the “humane” 
interpretation of crowd action—had acknowledged. The “mobs,” explained Wood, 
“often showed remarkable restraint, pinpointing their objectives with extraordinary 
care.”8 The limited nature and purposefulness of this American crowd had no more 
explicit herald than Lloyd Rudolph, who proclaimed, “in America, the mob stopped when 
it had attained what it had set out to do” and praised the “common middle class culture 
and character of the crowd” and its leaders.9 Maier interpreted the use of crowd action by 
the officially powerless “out of doors” faction as a “lawful” arm of extralegal political 
expression, and marveled at the way in which Americans harnessed “popular force . . . 
such that violence in the modern sense: the infliction of injury, death, or property 
damage—was for the most part avoided.”10 Wood, however, counseled caution, 
questioning the crowds’ supposedly non-violent, “remarkably moderate and disciplined” 
character as a quality unique to American crowds. In an influential essay, Wood 
proposed that what set European and American crowds apart was not necessarily their 
varying levels o f violence, but the ability of local authorities to put down public 
disturbances. Wood posited that, unlike in America—where established municipal 
authority was barely extant—the presence o f formidable local authority in Europe 
spurred the heightened confrontation and violence of crowd action. In short, it was 
“especially distorting to stress the unusual moderation and respect for lives displayed by
8 Gordon S. Wood, “A Note on Mobs in the American Revolution,” William and Mary Quarterly 23 
(October 1966), 636-637.
9 Lloyd I. Rudolph, “The Eighteenth Century Mob in Europe and America,” in American Quarterly, 11 
(Winter, 1959), 469.
10 Maier, “Charleston Mob,” Perspectives 4 (1970), 173.
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American crowds.”11 Mob actions in Revolutionary America rarely devolved into 
violence precisely because mob participants faced little if any policing. Perhaps, even, 
the crowd was the authority. Even this qualification, however, was not a complete 
indictment of American crowd exceptionalism, but only of a single tenet of Consensus 
thought. Indeed, even in Wood’s qualification of the Consensus position, he supported 
another signal characteristic o f the American mob by averring to Maier’s view of the 
crowd as an extralegal arm of communal authority.
Paul A. Gilje demonstrated the continued strength of the Consensus persuasion 
nearly two decades after Maier’s first writings on the community-oriented crowd. Gilje 
deemed eighteenth-century crowd action a “benign type of rioting”— actions condoned 
and performed by the community at large— and, above all, an effort to “preserve the
19 • •  •  •world as it was.” For Gilje, corporatism spurred townsfolk to participate in crowd
action. Their belief in society as an “organic whole” and the defense of the community
from outside aggression justified popular action. Crowd activity was perhaps the purest
form o f communal collaboration, undertaken to “support traditional customs and moral
11relationships” against external threats.
In Rude’s wake, then, Americanists like Maier, Wood, and later, Gilje, proffered a 
historiographic model of revolutionary era popular action that, while averring to many of 
Rude’s “humane” characterizations, also built upon these foundations to construct an 
exceptional American model. The revolutionary era crowd of the American port city
11 Wood, “Note on Crowds,” WMQ 23 (1966), 638.
12 Paul A. Gilje, Rioting in America (Bloomington, IN, 1986), 12.
13 Gilje, The Road to Mobocracy: Popular Disorder in New York City, 1763-1834. (Chapel Hill, NC, 
1987), 34.
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became, for Consensus scholars, reactionary, acting to preserve rather than upset social 
order. The social tumult that Le Bon had deemed primitive was, in fact, conservative.
Despite the “formidable paradigm” for crowd study established by historians such 
as Maier and Wood, critics of this “rubric-oriented past” soon voiced serious concerns of 
their own.14 Scholars of the “conflict” school questioned the monolithic composition of 
the revolutionary crowd as envisioned by consensus historians, denying that eighteenth- 
century crowds had a middle-class character and instead emphasizing the diverse 
composition and motives of crowds and their constituents. Social histories of the 
“inarticulate,” pioneered by Jesse Lemisch’s work on the seamen of late colonial and 
revolutionary America, helped spur a new “history from the bottom up,” which, while it 
certainly did not strip the crowd of an ideological significance, questioned the consensus 
version of the crowd’s ideological unanimity.15 Scholars like Thomas P. Slaughter 
doubted that revolutionary crowds had ever acted to retain corporate solidarity or had 
risen to fulfill some nostalgic vision of a harmonious and collective past.16 In fact, 
explained Dirk Hoerder, communal solidarity centered on such a shared past was 
impossible to achieve in the ethnically diverse urban centers of colonial America, where, 
by the mid-eighteenth century, “community homogeneity was a thing of the past.”17 
Crowd ideology, then, sprang not from a single vision of a homogenous people, but from 
differing viewpoints colored by diverse socioeconomic experiences.
14 Dirk Hoerder, “’Mobs, a Sort o f Them, at least, are Constitutional’: The American Revolution, Popular 
Participation, and Social Change,” Amerikastudien 22, (January, 1977), 303.
15 Jesse Lemisch, “The American Revolution Seen From the Bottom Up,” in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., 
Towards a New Past: Dissenting essays in American History (New York, 1968), 29.
16 Thomas P. Slaughter, “Crowds in Eighteenth-Century America: Reflections and New Directions,” 
Pennsylvania Magazine o f  History and Biography 1 (January 1991), 4.
17 Hoerder, “‘Mobs, a Sort o f  Them, at least, are Constitutional,”’ 301.
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Indeed, for Gary A. Nash, the agendas of poor and marginal crowd participants 
often differed starkly from those o f their social betters. The street tumults of the 
revolutionary era were in fact emblematic of the lower orders’ dissatisfaction with the 
social status quo: they were rebellions against the very social stability that, according to 
consensus scholars, entire communities had risen to protect. Instead of single-minded 
communal movements, then, Nash interpreted popular action as a means for society’s 
dregs to define and pursue their own goals. The historiographic pendulum had centered 
itself once more, balanced by two conflicting interpretations of revolutionary crowd 
action.18
Hoerder and other scholars have since engaged in a more pointed discussion of 
the American tea parties of 1773 and 1774. In several influential essays and monographs, 
Hoerder concluded that by the late stages of the pre-Revolutionary era, control of the 
crowd by local elites—merchants and planters, mainly—was “fairly well-established.”19 
Hoerder, however, did not deprive (as had Le Bon) the crowd of an ideological impetus. 
With an increase in the number of garrisoned British troops in North American ports and 
crown legislation that rankled members o f all social echelons of colonial America, 
however, elites had little trouble in leading a fairly united front against perceived British
18 Wood authored a resounding condemnation o f Conflict scholarship in his scathing review o f Nash’s 
latest work on Revolutionary America. Wood not only cast doubt on Nash’s findings but also implied that 
Nash’s undergirding biases kept him from an accurate interpretation o f the past. Indeed, Wood claimed, 
Nash “ha[d] always sought to project his political vision into history-writing.” That vision, according to 
Wood, was a Marxist one: an anachronistic perspective that held little relevance to study o f  the eighteenth- 
century world, and a worldview that distorted Nash’s interpretation o f revolutionary crowds. Wood 
chastised Nash for ignoring the findings o f  Maier and Gilje, who had “superbly demonstrated” that “the 
premodern mobs, far from being the preludes o f  revolutionary class warfare, were often testimonies to the 
paternal and hierarchical organization o f society,” instead deeming mob violence as class warfare, a 
struggle not between united protestors and threatening outsider, but between intracommunal groups. Still, 
then, the central questions regarding crowd action— communal consensus or fractiousness? Unified 
ideology or conflicting interests?— spark intense debate. Gordon S. Wood, “Political Correctness,” New  
Republic (June 6 and 13, 2005), 34, 38.
19 Dirk Hoerder, ““Boston Leaders and Boston Crowds, 1765-1776,” in Alfred F. Young, The American 
Revolution: Explorations in the History o f  American Radicalism  (DeKalb, IL, 1976), 265.
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transgressions. The crowds’ obedience to protest ringleaders, then, stemmed not from a 
lack of will or intelligence, but from the perception of a common and alien threat.
The crowd of the late pre-Revolutionary era had indeed become quite a political 
animal. Protestors of the period between 1765 and 1780 had, for Hoerder, cultivated a 
definite “political consciousness,” one that—at least for the moment, while the 
foundations of class-consciousness within urban society were still inchoate—dovetailed
J Owith the agenda of colonial America’s planter and merchant elite. By 1774, in fact, a 
“new form of mass action emerged during the universal resistance to British authority,” 
one in which crowds “made it abundantly clear that they did not interpret their actions as
J  1rioting but rather as open-air town meetings.” Crowd protestors were not the gentry’s 
henchmen, but their collaborators.
Despite Rude’s warning that identifying faces within the eighteenth-century 
crowd was a difficult task, most scholars have concluded that both master craftsmen and 
journeyman artisans held critical roles in the quasi-political public actions of the tea party 
era. In his seminal narrative of events in Boston, Benjamin Woods Labaree remarked 
that although it was customary for Bostonians of the post-Revolutionary era to claim a 
role in the tea parties for “men of all social stations . . . most alleged participants were 
artisans.”22 Mechanics seemed to have filled two stations within the crowds’ chain of 
command. Artisans of little or no affluence were most often actual members of the tea 
party crowds. With little social prestige to lose, these “nobodies”—at least in Boston— 
were able to destroy Crown property in public while donning only superficial “Mohawk” 
disguises, usually nothing more than a coal-blackened visage and an occasional feather
20 Hoerder, Crowd Action in Revolutionary Massachusetts (New York, 1977), 375.
21 Ibid., 375-376.
22 Benjamin Woods Labaree. The Boston Tea Party (New York, 1964), 143.
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for ornamentation.23 While one cannot dismiss the possibility that master mechanics, like 
their journeyman and apprentice underlings, dumped tea overboard from merchant ships 
or mobbed Crown officials, Hoerder has singled out these master craftsmen not as the 
crowd’s footsoldiers, but as crucial “intermediaries” between the watchful gentry elites 
and the jacks in the street who partook of the era’s crowd actions.24
Alfred F. Young has measured not only the extent to which artisans participated 
in tea party mobs but also articulated the often intangible benefits that artisans reaped by 
their participation. Young’s findings regarding Boston tea party member George Robert 
Twelves Hewes conveyed what at least one humble artisan gained from his destruction of 
British tea. Through his involvement in the nonimportation movement the shoemaker 
Hewes became a “citizen, a political man.” Hewes beheld, most squarely in December 
1773, a “sense of citizenship and personal worth” of which no one could ever deprive 
him. Young recounted how, years after the Revolution, an aged Hewes, penniless and 
broken by a life of seemingly bottomless economic valleys, had nevertheless retained his 
fondest memory of his involvement in the tea party: in an assertion that many of his 
contemporaries disputed, Hewes claimed to have thrown tea into Boston Harbor 
alongside merchant luminary and local Whig leader, John Hancock. The veracity of 
Hewes’ recollection is unimportant to Young’s argument. For the shoemaker, the tea 
party was a “moment of equality,” an event that transcended the extant socioeconomic 
power structure and, for an instant, allowed him to voice an opinion, to be a citizen—the 
equal of the wealthiest patriot in Boston.
23 Alfred F. Young, The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution (Boston, 
1999), 43.
24 Hoerder, “Boston Leaders and Boston Crowds, 1765-1776,” in Young, Alfred F. The American 
Revolution: Explorations in the History o f  American Radicalism (DeKalb, IL, 1976), 265.
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Such ready access to the thoughts and recollections of South Carolina’s 
nonimportation era crowd members is impossible. No participant recounted Charleston’s 
tea parties and their aftermaths as completely as George Hewes did for Boston. Faces in 
the Charleston crowd—not to mention their motivations—are difficult to identify. Yet in 
the stories of Charleston’s tea parties, tantalizing clues allow for preliminary conclusions 
regarding the effects of the tea party era upon both the common mechanics and master 
tradesmen of Iowcountry Carolina. In the different opportunities afforded rank and file 
participants of Charleston’s crowds and the affluent tradesmen who rose to political 
prominence in the wake of the tea parties, two trends of the nonimportation movement in 
Charleston emerge: the potential of the era to bring real change to the local political 
culture and, conversely, the persistence of socioeconomic hierarchy—though after the 
Revolution based less on birth than in previous times.
Their varied political experiences during the tea party era notwithstanding, 
Charleston’s artisans were a small and interwoven community of masters and day 
laborers, successful factors and marginal journeymen. They shared at least basic 
economic interests, especially regarding perceived threats to their livelihoods—British 
imports, for example. If  their commercial interests were at least somewhat similar, the 
political ascendancy of even the wealthiest artisan should have proved beneficial to all 
other craftsmen. Thus one cannot simply delineate between those mechanics who made 
substantial political gains during the era and those who did not. Artisans of the lower sort 
may indeed have viewed the gains of their affluent colleagues as advancements for the 
entire mechanic community. This possibility of gain by association aside, however, there 
is little doubt that those who did make concrete political advances—namely, by attaining
15
political office—were of a much loftier economic station than the mechanics who 
remained politically anonymous after the brief outbursts of 1773 and 1774. Though such 
a conclusion may seem decidedly unextraordinary, inevitable, even—when the real 
political gains of the few are viewed against the contextual backdrop of what preceded 
them, namely, at least some degree of popular empowerment of artisans from across an 
array of socioeconomic stations, the ascendence of wealthy artisans in this second stage 
of empowerment in Charleston seems less an inevitable progression than a divergence 
from the erstwhile pattern of broad popular empowerment. Nevertheless, for lower 
artisans, a fundamental and grave struggle for economic viability remained the 
preeminent concern long after the American Revolution. Indeed, despite the political rise 
of .Charleston’s most prominent artisans after the tea parties, the daily struggles of most 
of the city’s mechanics—not for political clout but for basic economic survival—  
continued unabated throughout the early national era.
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CHAPTER I 
Charleston’s Artisans In Their World
Knowledge of the preconditions and social pressures that compelled the 
substantial—but often overlooked— artisan demographic to embrace popular action are 
necessary for a fuller appreciation of what truly was at stake for those mechanics who 
participated in the tea parties. Despite their importance to Charleston’s economy, 
mechanics faced serious political and economic disadvantages during the colonial period. 
While artisans throughout British North America competed for market shares against the 
imported goods of the metropole, the undercutting of white by slave labor was an 
especially acute problem in Charleston. For upwards of seven decades, however—since 
Charleston crossed the urban threshold and gained sufficient residents to exhibit any kind 
of social hierarchy—artisans shouldered this burden and accepted their undistinguished 
middle position within society. Consistent commercial hardship and the unprecedented 
political upheaval of the late colonial era, however, marginalized artisans more than ever 
before, and eventually brought events to a flashpoint.
It would be wrong, however, to assume that artisans inevitably joined the protests 
against the tea because they sought more money, status, or political power. After years of 
sustained economic and political pressure, Charleston’s artisans were a patient, even a 
resigned, lot. Artisans of all economic stations had inhabited a society in which social, 
political, and economic difference was at least tepidly accepted. Supporting themselves
17
and their families was more important than shaping public policy. The continued 
economic and political hardships of the late colonial era, however, culminating in the 
complete disabling of local government during the Wilkes Fund controversy, encouraged 
them to step forward.
For most of the eighteenth century, however, Charleston seemed an unlikely 
locale for a crisis with at least partially economic roots. Charleston was British North 
America’s “most important commercial center south of Philadelphia.” The bustling and 
diverse port city was home (chosen or otherwise) to wealthy merchants and planters, to 
sailors and black slaves. Between the social extremes of owner and human chattel, 
however, a considerable free artisan community also called Charleston home. Though 
the city’s black majority made Charleston “resemble the West Indies” more than its 
northerly neighbors, by 1790, white artisans accounted for twenty-two percent of the 
city’s free population and were prolific contributors to the city’s material culture. Even 
during the late colonial era, mechanics, according to royal governor James Glen, 
accounted for nearly one-fifth o f the city’s white population. Mechanics were critical to 
Charleston’s prosperity, offering many services essential to the local economy. Skilled 
craftsmen such as shipbuilders, coopers, candlemakers, and gunsmiths; industrial artisans 
such as cabinetmakers, silversmiths, engravers, and blacksmiths— all were “mechanics.” 
Indeed, the contemporary definition of “mechanical arts” read: “such Arts wherein the 
Hand and Body [were] more concerned than the mind.” While this term discounted the 
virtuosity attained by many master craftsmen, it denoted the wide assortment of duties 
that mechanics and artisans o f various employs fulfilled throughout the city.
25N[athan] Bailey, Dictionarium Britannicum (London, 1730), Special Collections, John D. Rockefeller 
Library, Williamsburg, VA.
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Predictably, economic prosperity varied dramatically within the artisan 
demographic, as mechanics comprised a “vertical, and not horizontal section of the 
colonial population.”26 Successful artisans like John Rose, for example—a shipbuilder 
who amassed a personal fortune worth more than £30,000 sterling before the beginning 
of the American Revolution—occupied much different financial straits than most 
carpenters or blacksmiths. Rose was one of the exceptions; the majority of mechanics 
were not affluent members of Charleston society. Many seemed, though, to have earned 
competences sufficient to purchase small tracts of property and to support their families. 
Mechanics, then, were not gentlemen for the most part, but neither were they all day- 
laborers. They held an “intermediate position in the prestige hierarchy,” and were, for
9 8historian Richard Walsh, colonial Charleston’s “middle class.” Fierce economic 
competition, however, made prosperity elusive for many artisans. The city’s burgeoning 
import market left craftsmen to contend with the trendy and often less expensive baubles 
of the mother country, while unpaid slave labor threatened to compromise the economic 
viability of white artisans from below.
The mass importation of European finished products left many craftsmen at a 
commercial disadvantage. Though the coopers who sold storage barrels to outgoing 
mariners and the shipwrights who repaired foreign vessels benefited from their 
commercial relationships with Britain, most artisans suffered from the imbalance of trade 
between colony and mother country. Imports flooded the local market. Goods from all 
British commercial centers filled the merchants’ shop windows on King and Broad
26 Carl Bridenbaugh, The Colonial Craftsman (New York, 1950), 156.
27 Richard Walsh, Charleston’s Sons o f  Liberty: A Study o f  the Artisans, 1763-1789 (Columbia, SC, 1959), 
3. (hereafter Sons o f  Liberty). For a condensed version o f Walsh’s study, see “The Charleston Mechanics:
A Brief Study,” South Carolina Historical Magazine 60 (April 1959), 123-144.
28 Walsh, Charleston’s Sons o f  Liberty, 111.
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Streets. Dockworkers unloaded a seemingly inexhaustible reserve of goods from the 
hulls o f the merchant vessels anchored in Charleston Harbor. Artisans fretted, as “before 
their eyes,” an unending stream of European products arrived at local warehouses and
7 Qbusied the stevedores on the piers of Charleston. Newspapers spoke of the glut of 
imports. Lists of available goods filled columns on the frontpage of the South Carolina 
Gazette. Amidst notices for estate sales and slave auctions, advertisements of foreign 
goods informed Charlestonians of their buying options and reminded artisans of the 
import’s burgeoning popularity in the local marketplace. Joshua Lockwood, a merchant 
who advertised his extensive inventory lists with regularity throughout the pre- 
Revolutionary era, offered an array of goods, from “silver handled knives and forks” to 
“Turtle Shell Tooth-Pick cases” and “Gentlemen’s pocket-books of all kinds.”30 Samuel 
Gordon, a merchant of Elliott Street, hawked “a large and valuable Assortment of Goods” 
including “Mahogany Tea-Chests” and “a Choice of Men’s fine fashionable hats.”31 
Across Charleston, discriminating customers could easily find a “complete assortment of 
European articles” to satisfy their piqued appetites for the fineries of Europe.32 
Merchants had brought the luxuries of the metropole to the empire’s provincial 
appendages.
Local craftsmen advertised less frequently than their merchant competitors. 
When artisans did submit product descriptions to the newspaper, it was with a keen 
awareness of the craftsman’s struggle to locate a niche within an import-dominated 
marketplace. Furniture maker Richard Magrath, owner of a shop on King Street,
29 Ibid., 57.
30 South Carolina Gazette (hereafter SCG), October 8, 1772.
31 Ibid., November 5, 1772.
32 Ibid., January 21, 1772.
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preceded the listing of his “Double Chests of Drawers, Dining Tables, Carved Chairs, and 
Sophas” with an assurance to readers that he had an “Assortment of Work for Sale which 
[he] will engage to be as good as any imported from Europe.”33 Haberdasher Richard 
Hurlstone prefaced his advertisements with the avowal that he and his partner Charles 
Robert “ma[d]e and s[old] hats of all Kinds, Sizes . . . equal in Quality and Neatness to 
any ever imported.” Perhaps to assure readers of his refined tastes, Hurlstone always 
noted that he himself was “from London.” More than others, mechanics realized the 
advantage of being an import.34
While imports menaced artisan economic well-being from abroad, unpaid slave 
labor threatened to undercut the value of white artisan labor from below. Philip D. 
Morgan’s research on colonial Charleston—while focused on the slave perspective— 
elucidated the plight of the white craftsman.35 Blacks— some free, most unfree— 
pervaded Charleston, and were the preeminent laborers in many of the city’s industries 
and trades.36 Slaves dominated not only the fish market, where they daily hawked their 
wares, but also the maritime and riverine traffic on the Santee River, where slaves 
undertook jobs as ship pilots and other roles of commensurate responsibility. But more 
importantly for the city’s white artisans, slaves—whether as members of work crews or 
as independently contracted craftsmen—“infiltrated” even the city’s specialized trades.
33 Ibid., July 23, 1772.
34 Ibid., April 2, 1772.
35 Philip D. Morgan, “Black Life in Eighteenth-Century Charleston,” Perspectives in American History, 
New Series 1 (1984), 187-232. See also Morgan, Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth 
Century Chesapeake and Low Country (Chapel Hill, NC, 1998) and Peter H. Wood, Black Majority: 
Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion (New York, 1974).
36 As Wood and Morgan both make plain, the Lowcountry’s “black majority” was fundamental to the 
emergence o f the paranoid style that pervaded white thought in colonial South Carolina after the Stono 
Rebellion. Artisan visions o f  a market in which slaves predominated may have in some ways exemplified 
such fears, but were not simply the fabrications o f  excited white minds. Blacks— free and unfree— were a 
prime source o f  competition for white (and, by comparison, overpriced) artisan labor.
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White masters employed slaves as gunsmiths, silversmiths, and at other posts requiring 
considerable technical acumen.37 Thomas Elfe, a wealthy cabinetmaker and slaveowner, 
not only employed slaves in his workshop but also subcontracted their services to his 
business associates. Two of Elfe’s slaves, Oxford and Lake, often worked away from 
home for periods of six to eight months. Elfe’s system proved profitable. Between 1768 
and 1775, the cabinetmaker made annual deposits in his ledger book to a “handicraft 
slaves” account for several hundred pounds Sterling.38 Artisans who competed for jobs 
against unfree mechanics like Oxford and Lake suffered from Elfe’s business savvy. 
Thus while affluent artisans prospered from this consignment labor system, such 
practices certainly undercut those mechanics who depended on their own labor. This 
controversial system of labor—for the wealthy artisan an effective use of his “assets” but 
for other mechanics a dire blow to competitive white labor—would remain a point of 
inter-artisanal contention long after the Revolutionary era.
By the latter stages of the colonial era, then, a grave dual threat confronted many 
of Charleston’s artisans. Whether through the importation of inexpensive finished goods 
from across the Atlantic Ocean or the undercutting of free by slave labor, most artisans 
had good reason to view their economic fortunes with pessimism. Lowcountry 
gentlemen, however, exhibited little sympathy for the artisan plight. A lack of concern 
bordering on outright callousness often colored a planter or merchant’s musings on 
artisans and other “humani generis.”39 Such attitudes were in fact common in a society in 
which difference—not only racial, but also socioeconomic—was understood. Historian
37 Morgan, “Black Life,” Perspectives, 196-197.
38 Mabel L. Webber (contributor), “The Thomas Elfe Account Book, 1768-1775,” South Carolina
Historical and Genealogical Magazine 35-40 (April 1934-July 1939).
39 William Henry Drayton, comp., The Letters o f  Freeman, Etc., ed. Robert M. Weir (Columbia, SC,
1977), 30-31.
22
Carl Bridenbaugh once noted that a colonial gentleman tended to “look down a well-bred 
nose at the tradesman.”40 Such was certainly the case in the eighteenth-century 
lowcountry. For Carolina planter and merchant luminary William Henry Drayton, 
mechanics were Charleston’s “profanum vulgus.”41 Wealthy visitors to the lowcountry 
echoed these sentiments. During his tour of South Carolina in 1773, in which he dined 
with wealthy merchants and planters, danced with their daughters, and attended musical 
concerts performed by well-paid musicians, Massachusetts native Josiah Quincy, Jr., 
limned the stark outlines of the lowcountry’s social hierarchy. Charlestonians, the 
Yankee aristocrat concluded, “may well be divided into opulent and lordly planters, poor 
and spiritless peasants and vile slaves.” The young New Englander echoed the gentry’s 
opinion of the city’s mechanic class quite clearly when he added that the “middling order 
in the capital [we]re odious characters.”42
*
Whatever resentment mechanics may have harbored for Charleston’s 
condescending gentry or the economic imbalance of either the mercantile or slave labor 
systems, they rarely manifested their dissatisfaction through political channels. Yet most 
mechanics were not necessarily bereft o f political power. South Carolina law, in fact, 
guaranteed the voting rights of many craftsmen. Strict eligibility requirements for 
membership in the state’s legislature and the electorate’s deference to its assemblymen, 
however, imbued South Carolina politics with a constancy that buffered elected officials 
from the interests o f the enfranchised public. The Commons House of Assembly, with its
40 Carl Bridenbaugh, The Colonial Craftsman (New York, 1950), 161.
41 Drayton, comp., Letters o f  Freeman, Etc., (Columbia, SC, 1977), 30-31.
42 Mark Antony DeWolfe Howe, comp. “Journals o f  Josiah Quincy, Jun.,” Massachusetts Historical 
Society, Proceedings XLIX (October 1915-June 1916), 454-455.
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affluent and well-acquainted members, was, for one historian, more akin to a 
“gentleman’s club” than a representative political body.43
While the Voting Act of 1721 enfranchised South Carolina’s small property 
owners and thus provided a degree of political agency for many mechanics, the 
legislation also established strict criteria for membership in the Commons House of 
Assembly that affirmed the mechanics’ virtual presence in South Carolina politics. 
Assuredly, most artisans met or exceeded the voting requirements set forth by the statute. 
Aside from the basic age, residency, and race qualifications (the most stringent 
prerequisites for the vote) a minimum of twenty shillings in annual tax payments and 
ownership of a fifty-acre freehold were rarely problematic for reasonably successful 
artisans. A viable candidate for the assembly, however, had to own “a settled plantation 
or free-hold . . .  at least five hundred acres o f land, ten slaves or h[ad] in his own right, to 
the value of one thousand pounds in houses, buildings, town lots or other lands.”44 Thus 
the land assets alone of the least affluent assemblyman dwarfed the personal estate of the 
average mechanic, which historian Jackson Turner Main estimated as approximately 
£110 sterling.45 Consequently, few South Carolinians could fulfill the necessary financial 
prerequisites for assembly membership. The effects of such a circumscribed candidate 
pool were apparent. Reelection was commonplace for members of the ruling elite. 
Between 1762 and 1768, a period that encompassed three election cycles, seventy-five
43 Frederick P. Bowes, The Culture o f  Early Charleston (Chapel Hill, NC, 1942), 115.
44 Thomas Cooper, The Statutes o f  South Carolina, III, Containing The Acts From 1716, Exclusive, To 
1752, Inclusive (Columbia, SC, 1838), 137.
45 Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure o f  Revolutionary America (Princeton, NJ, 1965), 79.
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assemblymen, many of whom were second or third-term representatives, filled a possible 
117 seats in the Commons House of Assembly.46
The familiar faces and similar backgrounds of most members lent an air of 
informality to the assembly’s proceedings. After he visited the assembly, Josiah Quincy, 
Jr. (always a willing critic) decried the legislature’s casualness: “The members convened, 
lolled, and chatted much like a friendly jovial society, when nothing of importance was 
before the house; nay once or twice while the speaker and clerk were busy in writing the 
members spoke quite loud across the room to one another. A very unparliamentary 
appearance.”47 Indeed, though Commons House assemblymen attained membership 
through public election, the chummy setting of their legislature was far removed from the 
everyday existences and interests of freeholder artisans. Quincy may have been justified 
in concluding that assemblymen “[we]re all very wealthy, and have in general but little 
solicitude about the concerns of the many.”48 Thus, while many mechanics could claim a 
participatory role in South Carolina politics, few could assert that their elected 
representative remained attuned to the electorate’s concerns once he gained membership 
to the insular assembly.
Nevertheless, Charleston’s mechanics did not voice overt opposition to the 
established political arrangement. For the electors, wealth may have been a perceived 
attribute of the “good ruler,” while economic independence “promoted courage and
46 The Voting Act o f 1721 allotted the following number o f seats to each parish in the assembly: St. 
Philip’s, 5; Christ Church, 2; St. John’s, 3; St. Andrew’s, 3; St. George’s, 2; St. James Goose Creek, 4; St. 
Thomas, 3; St. Dennis, 3; St. Paul’s, 4; St. Bartholomew’s, 4; St. Helena, 4; and St. James Santee, 2. In 
each o f the elections o f 1762, 1765, and 1768, then, candidates vied for thirty-nine seats, or a total o f  one- 
hundred-seventeen seats over the three-election cycle. And yet, only seventy-five South Carolinians 
became assemblymen during that period. Cooper, Statutes, III, 137, and Jerome J. Nadelhaft, The
Disorders o f  War: The Revolution in South Carolina (Orono, ME, 1981), 4.
47 Howe, Journal o f  Quincy, Jr., 452.
48 Ibid., 454.
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fostered rational behavior.” Though these perceived virtues of wealth helped to reinforce 
the belief that members of the elite should rule, other, more mundane factors also kept 
even the wealthiest artisans from the inner workings of local government. The 
mechanic’s long workday, for instance, was a practical explanation for the artisan’s 
absence from the assembly.49 Even if government officials had reduced the economic 
demands for assembly candidacy and permitted a wealthy shipwright like John Rose or 
cooper David Saylor to pursue public office, the assembly’s frequent meetings would 
have conflicted with the mechanic’s professional responsibilities.50 Furthermore, the 
assembly’s tradition of unpaid public service made political office an unfeasible 
proposition for even the most successful artisans. The assembly thus remained the 
exclusive domain of those who could afford disinterested and unpaid service: the low 
country planter and merchant elite. The colony’s adherence to this “aristocratic 
principle” not only enabled the gentry to retain its stranglehold on colonial politics, but 
also further detached the mechanic elector from his gentleman representative.51
The “lasting political peace” in South Carolina before the 1760s, then, was partly 
dependent on the mechanics’ acceptance of a limited role in colonial government.52 The 
planters and merchants ruled while the artisans and the slaves worked. David Ramsay, 
one of the era’s most widely-read pundits, described those supposedly halcyon days: 
“Every man was healthy and industrious . . . they were also content and wished not for 
the smallest change in their political institution.” Yet in the decade before war with
49 Robert M. Weir, Colonial South Carolina: A History (Millwood, NY, 1983), 135.
50 By many accounts, Saylor was the most affluent cooper in Charleston. On the eve o f the Revolution, he 
employed more than thirty other barrel-makers and owned several slaves. Walsh, Sons o f  Liberty, 24.
51 Bowes, The Culture o f  Early Charleston, 115.
52 Eugene Sirmans, Colonial South Carolina: A Political History, 1663-1763 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1966), 224.
53 David Ramsay, History o f  South Carolina From Its First Settlement in 1670 to the Year 1808 (Newberry, 
SC, 1858), 69.
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Great Britain, visceral conflict within the South Carolina governmental system deprived 
the mechanic of any previous political agency he had held through virtual representation 
in the Commons House of Assembly. The timing could not have been worse. As the 
fiscal encroachments of the royal government infringed upon the craftsman’s chance for 
prosperity, mechanics lost even their former, constricted avenues of political expression. 
Without the means to pursue legitimate political protest, artisans took to the streets to 
voice their opinions. In the 1760s, amidst the contention surrounding increased English 
taxation and what would be known as the Wilkes Fund controversy, the roots of the 
mechanic’s extralegal expression took hold out of necessity. These protest experiences 
shaped artisan political activity for the duration of the colonial period.
The Wilkes Fund controversy derailed royal government in South Carolina. From 
1769 until the outbreak of war, the disagreement between the Commons House of 
Assembly and the Crown over fund appropriation ground the daily operations of royally 
sanctioned government to a halt. Historians have long acknowledged the significance of 
the colony’s administrative shutdown in the pre-war years as representative of the ever- 
widening gap between colony and mother country. Henry Wallace referred to the 
controversy as one “unprecedented in the history of the province.”54 Historian Jack 
Greene posited that the crisis “furnished abundant testimony to the seriousness of the 
imperial challenge and helped to crystallize Revolutionary sentiment among the colony’s 
political leaders.”55 Though the jurisdictional struggle between Commons House and 
crown was significant, the effect o f the Wilkes Fund controversy on the politically
54 David D. Wallace, The Life o f  Henry Laurens; With A Sketch o f  the Life o f  Lieutenant Colonel John 
Laurens (New York, 1915), 163.
55 Jack P. Greene, “Bridge to Revolution: The Wilkes Fund controversy in South Carolina, 1769-1775,” 
Journal o f  Southern History XXIX (February 1963), 19-52.
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marginal mechanic demographic—while less explored by scholars—was also extensive. 
Indeed, South Carolina’s “governmental paralysis” jeopardized the relationship between 
crown and colony, and thrust a new sense of political detachment upon all Carolinians, 
not solely the colony’s craftsmen. For Charleston’s artisans, however, this development 
was the final constriction of their already limited political rights, privileges that had been 
tenuous and indirect from the start.56
In the autumn of 1769, while tensions over the Townshend Acts still roiled the 
relationship between Britain and her American colonies, South Carolina’s descent into 
governmental impasse began with the seemingly mundane payment of a defendant’s legal 
fees. The accused was John Wilkes, a known English critic of King George III who had 
gained notoriety on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean for his outspoken denunciations of 
royal policy.57 In 1768 the Crown charged Wilkes with libel and slander. His subsequent 
arrest, however, only enhanced the rebel’s cult popularity. Wilkes’s supporters in 
London founded the Society of the Gentlemen Supporters of the Bill of Rights, which 
petitioned the American colonies for contributions to a legal fund for the defendant. 
Most of the colonies were not forthcoming. Planters in Maryland donated forty-five 
hogsheads of tobacco but only South Carolina obliged the society’s request with a hard 
currency contribution. On December 8 the assembly appropriated £1,500 sterling for 
donation to the Society of Gentlemen. Unbeknownst to the assemblymen, their
56 Robert M. Weir, “A Most Important Epocha”: The Coming o f  the Revolution in South Carolina 
Tricentennial Booklet Number Five (Columbia, SC, 1970), 49.
57 On April 23, 1763, Wilkes’s North Briton, No. 45, criticized the king’s speech from the throne. After 
ensuing legal troubles and a period o f exile in France, Wilkes returned to England, only to be imprisoned in 
the Tower o f  London. For Greene, Wilkes became “associated with the cause o f liberty,” as his 
imprisonment and the Crown’s taxation o f the colonies “were viewed as part o f the same general assault on 
liberty.” Jack P. Greene, Quest fo r Power: The Lower Houses o f  Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies, 
1689-1776 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1963), 404. For a contemporary account o f Wilkes’s imprisonment and the 
text o f  his infamous pamphlet, see An Authentick Account o f  the Proceedings Against John Wilkes, Esq. 
(Philadelphia, 1763 [orig. pub. London, 1763]).
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appropriation from the treasury would be one o f the last fiscal transactions of the colonial 
period.58
The assembly had somewhat ulterior motivations for its action. Overshadowed by 
the restive New England colonies, many members of the assembly longed to stage a 
novel protest against the Crown. The Gazette described the underlying purpose of the 
donation: “In this instance, it cannot be said that we have followed the example of the 
Northern Colonies.”59 These measures of “boldness and originality” were, if nothing 
else, demonstrative.60 Not only had the grant to Wilkes galvanized South Carolina’s 
support of a slanderer of George III, but the appropriation had also been made without 
consent of the colony’s royal council. Predictably, the Crown reacted with vigor. On 
April 14, 1770, the king issued his “additional instructions” regarding the contested 
contribution. Because it was “highly just and necessary that the most effectual measures 
be pursued for putting a stop to such dangerous and unwarrantable practices,” the Crown 
directed South Carolina’s Lieutenant Governor William Bull never to assent to a 
monetary appropriation that would defray “any expense occurred for services or purposes 
not immediately arising within or incident to our said province of South Carolina.” The 
Crown’s orders were a patent proscription of the “lately assumed” powers of the lower 
house to appropriate money as it saw fit.61
This fundamental disagreement between Crown and colony over fund 
appropriation proved an immovable obstacle to all government legislation in the last
58 Committee to Robert Morris, December 8, 1769, in “Correspondence o f Charles Garth,” South Carolina 
Historical and Genealogical Magazine, XXXI (April 1930), 132-133.
59 SCG, December 8, 1769.
60 Green, “Bridge to Revolution,” JSH, XXIX (February 1963), 21.
61 “Method o f Appropriating Money in South Carolina,” in Leonard Woods Labaree, ed., Royal 
Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776, I, (New York, 1935), 208-209.
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years before the Revolution. The assembly’s insistence that the Wilkes donation was a 
legitimate transaction became a cause celebre in Charleston. Repeated prorogations of 
the legislature and years of stalemate failed to deter either the colonial assembly or royal 
government. The disagreement pervaded all aspects of the government. After 1769 the 
assembly did not pass another tax bill. After 1771 the assembly did not enact a single
f i 'Xpiece of legislation for the duration of the colonial era. The assembly, which had at 
least ostensibly served as the electorate’s political voice, faded into irrelevance. While 
the Wilkes affair’s raising of questions regarding the assumed powers of a governing 
body were perhaps too removed from daily life to profoundly affect the everyday 
existences of Charleston’s mechanics, the enervation of the Commons House was a 
development of singular importance to the middling sort. The controversy tore away the 
only shred of representative government available to the electorate. By the early 1770s, 
Charleston’s mechanics were without even a nominal political voice. The “governmental 
vacuum” created by the Wilkes affair had turned South Carolina’s top-heavy political
64structure on its ear.
The Wilkes Fund controversy’s full proscription of the mechanic’s already 
circumscribed political voice came at a most inopportune time: heightened royal taxation 
threatened the economic well-being of most mechanics. Yet in the decade before 
revolution, artisans and craftsmen responded to the perceived “intrusion” of British 
colonial policy through effective, if less official, means.65 Organizations like the Sons of 
Liberty afforded mechanics an effective channel of extralegal protest, while their alliance
62 Greene, “Bridge to Revolution,” JSH  XXIX (February 1963), 32.
63 Greene, Quest For Power, 416.
64 George Edward Frakes, Laboratory fo r  Liberty (Lexington, KY, 1970), 101.
65 Joyce Appleby, “The Social Origins o f  American Revolutionary Ideology,” Journal o f  American History, 
LXIV (March 1978), 954.
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with local powerbroker Christopher Gadsden gave artisan interests an unprecedented air 
of “patrician respectability.”66 Indeed, the ten years before the first tea party of 
December 1773 witnessed the politicization of the mechanic.
Crown policy of the 1760s posed a serious threat to the prosperity of Charleston’s 
master craftsmen. The Stamp Act imposed a high tax on all contracts negotiated with 
apprentices, while the Currency Act lessened an already insufficient amount of 
circulating paper money, making it difficult for mechanics to both collect and pay 
debts.67 With their orthodox avenues for protest blocked by legislative inactivity and 
indifference, mechanics sought union in extralegal associations like the Sons of Liberty. 
The high percentage of artisan membership in the Sons of Liberty during Charleston’s 
protest o f the Stamp Act revealed the extent to which mechanics had, even at that early 
date, adopted unofficial means to pursue political goals. Mechanics comprised the vast 
majority o f those who met under the Liberty Tree in 1766 to celebrate the repeal of the 
Stamp Act. The roster of twenty-six attendees included six carpenters, three painters, two 
blacksmiths, a tailor, a wheelwright, a saddler, and an upholsterer. Their participation in 
such an association endowed artisans with a quasi-political vehicle for their interests. 
This new form of popular participation was disconcerting to many supporters of royal 
policy. Even after Charlestonians relaxed most of their nonimportation resolutions in 
December 1770 (measures which local artisans had fervently supported), Lieutenant 
Governor Bull remained convinced that the “clouds of popular discontent” would
66 Walsh, Sons o f  Liberty, 32.
67 According to Walsh, the price o f a stamp for negotiating a contract with an apprentice was £7 sterling, or 
more than half o f  a mechanic’s weekly wages; ibid., 143-145.
68 “A List o f Those Persons Who First Met At Liberty Tree, In Charleston, In The Fall o f  the Year 1766, 
After The Repeal o f the Stamp Act,” in R. W. Gibbes, ed., Documentary History o f  the American 
Revolution: 1764-1776 (New York, 1855), 10-11.
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reappear. The governor’s apprehension was prescient. Many of the same mechanics who 
had gathered under the Liberty Tree in 1766 to celebrate the repeal of the Stamp Act and 
had lobbied for nonimportation later in the 1760s held active roles in the popular 
demonstrations of the 1770s and would benefit from the resultant political upheaval.69 
The popular actions of the tea party era would continue Charleston’s legacy of popular 
action begun during the Stamp Act protests. Public protests of 1773 and 1774 allowed an 
important but economically and politically limited portion of the population to gain, at 
least for a time, a public voice.
69 Great Britain. Public Records Office: Lieutenant Governor William Bull to Earl o f  Dartmouth, 





The widening of the participatory dimensions of Charleston’s first public and then 
political spheres o f authority during the nonimportation era began in earnest on 
December 1, 1773, when city residents contested the first of three tea shipments from 
English merchants. During this initial tea party, crowd members gathered—much as 
George Hewes and his compatriots had in Boston—as “citizens” to remonstrate against 
the perceived transgressions of the East India Company’s merchant mariners and local 
consignees. They would do so twice more, during the summer and winter of 1774.
These second and third tea parties, while expressing similar sentiments as the initial 
protest, offered their own indications of crowd empowerment. In July 1774, crowd 
participants attempted to exact violent retribution upon a British merchant captain, and 
exhibited a public authority that broke with their past sociopolitical docility. That 
November, Charlestonians would undertake their only destruction of British tea, as crowd 
members cemented their international reputation as public protestors of British policy. 
Whatever the effects of such recalcitrance upon the colony’s relationship with the 
metropole, the tea parties had undeniably empowering effects on the “gentlemen of the 
schools” and journeyman artisans who took to the streets in 1773 and 1774.
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The South Carolina Gazette had reported the comings and goings of Captain
« 70Alexander Curling and his vessel the London for years. The captain’s cargoes of 
imports had replenished the inventories of local merchants since the beginning of the 
decade. But the London's sighting off the Charleston bar on December 1, 1773, and 
arrival in the harbor one day later caused an unusual stir. While the merchant crew 
prepared to anchor, “handbills were circulated” throughout the city, “inviting all the 
inhabitants, without exception to assemble in the Great Hall over the Exchange.”71 At 
issue was Curling’s cargo: 257 chests o f Bohea Tea, a load that violated Charleston’s
77nonimportation agreement. Charlestonians attended the subsequent meeting in droves. 
To one observer, the rafters of the Exchange Building seemed to “creek” from the burden
7of accommodating such a congregation. Amidst the clamor, townsmen called upon the 
merchants who had agreed to import the tea—Roger Smith, Peter Leger, and William 
Greenwood—to explain their flouting of the city’s nonimportation resolution. In a 
“wrath of declamation,” chief interrogator Christopher Gadsden harangued the three 
merchants. Unsurprisingly, before the disapproving masses and vociferous Gadsden, the 
consignees soon “saw the propriety of abiding by the sense of the community thus 
formally expressed” and agreed to join the extant nonimportation association.74 As a 
closing measure, attendees established a “General Committee” to secure full subscription 
to the nonimportation agreement from city residents. The committee members were all 
men of affluence. Three—Charles Pinckney, Charles C. Pinckney, and Thomas
70 See advertisements in the Gazette (SCG) for period o f 1770-1773.
71 Ibid. December 6, 1773.
72 Ibid. The cargo was valued at about £157 sterling.
73 Ibid.
74 John Drayton, Memoirs o f  the American Revolution, From Its Commencement to the 
Year 1776, Inclusive; As Relating to the State o f  South-Carolina and Occasionally 
Referring To North-Carolina and Georgia, I (New York, 1969 [orig. pub.
Charleston, SC, 1821]), 98.
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Ferguson—were planters. Mechanics’ champion Christopher Gadsden and wealthy
• " 7 C
craftsman Daniel Cannon were also selected for committee membership.
Lieutenant Governor William Bull did not attend the “Meeting of the 
Inhabitants,” and was suspicious o f the gathering from the outset. In a recounting of the 
incident to his superiors at Whitehall, he intimated that the volatile tenor at the Exchange 
had been the determining factor in the merchants’ change of heart. For Bull, the agents 
o f the East India Company were “prevailed upon by threats and flattery,” and had little 
choice but to accord with public sentiment.76 Despite Bull’s doubts, however, Curling’s 
controversial shipment stayed aboard the London, and tensions over the tea remained 
high throughout the first three weeks of December.77 Anonymous letters from “warm, 
bold spirits” warned Curling to “hawl his ship into stream,” and that there was a “desire
7Rto do some mischief to her, for bringing over the tea.” Even the owners of the wharf 
where Curling’s vessel lay received word that their property would be “fire[d]” unless the
70 * •London “was obliged to quit the wharf.” Bull perceived the gravity of the situation, 
and on December 21, 1773, the acting governor summoned the colony’s royal council 
and the London’s master and owner to his home to discuss the impasse.
Gathered at the governor’s residence that Friday evening, members of the Council 
sounded the captain’s sentiments. Curling began by assuring the governor that he was 
not then “under apprehension of personal violence.”80 Yet neither he nor Mr. Lord—the
75 Walter Fraser, Jr., Charleston! Charleston! The History o f  a Southern City (Columbia, SC, 1989), 136; 
Edgar Walter, South Carolina: A History (Columbia, SC, 1998), 121.
76 Great Britain. Public Records Office: Lieutenant Governor William Bull to Earl o f  Dartmouth,





80 Drayton, Memoirs, 116.
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London’s Charleston-based owner—knew “what would be the consequence . . .  if the tea
o 1
was landed.” Customs officer Robert Haliday further complicated the situation when 
he informed Bull that after twenty-one days he would have to seize the tea for non-
•  • O 'J
payment of royal duties and stow the cargo in the “King’s Stores” below the Exchange.
By all accounts, Bull was torn. Though the fulfillment of Haliday’s 
responsibilities might resolve the stalemate in the crown’s favor, the governor feared the 
violent opposition of city residents, what one contemporary deemed the “hostile opinion
07
of the People.” The customs collector was adamant, however, and convinced Bull to 
allow the sheriff to accompany him aboard the London, “to attend to keep the peace, if 
any tumult should be made, when the tea was landed.”84 The course of action set, Bull 
asked his councilors whether “any other measures [were] necessary to be taken.” Council 
members replied unanimously in the negative. “They were in hopes,” noted one observer 
that the “measures already directed, would be effectual on the present occasion.” Bull 
and his advisors retired, placing their faith in the customs collector and his armed escort.
On December 22, Haliday and John Morris, Charleston’s Comptroller o f 
Customs, came aboard the London. Morris awoke Curling and begged him to bring the 
tea ashore. Soon the crew was “hard at work” and by noon, after five hours of 
transporting the controversial goods, the men had stowed “half the tea in the warehouse, 
and the rest before the door [of the Crown’s stores].” Residents, meanwhile, posed no 
threat to the customs officers’ actions. The Gazette observed, “the People, though not 






completed the landing “by the Time that the People in general imagined it would be 
begun.”85 In hindsight, the customs officer was satisfied with his efficiency, remarking 
that the tea had been “seized, landed, and stored . . . without one Person appearing to 
oppose him.” Comptroller Morris, despite initial foreboding, noted not the “least 
disturbance” by city residents.86 Charleston’s first tea party had not been well attended.
The timely diffusion of tensions and the initiative taken by Bull’s men, however, 
did very little to temper the local significance of the first tea party. The proceedings at 
the Exchange and the bullying of the East Indian Company’s agents disturbed the Crown. 
With Gadsden impugning their actions and the public looking on, the agents certainly had 
little choice but to renounce their practices and rejoin the fold. Historians have 
chronicled similar episodes of public shaming during the revolutionary era. Perhaps the 
most notable of these works are Rhys Isaac’s studies of the “dramaturgical” in 
revolutionary Virginia. As with Virginians compelled to take oaths at local courthouses, 
transgressors in Charleston appeared before an assembled public at a place of communal 
importance—in this instance, not a courthouse, but an exchange, the epicenter of 
mercantile life in bustling Charleston—and received a stern rebuke for their actions. 
The role of the crowd at the Exchange as onlookers, however, was far from passive. 
Behind Gadsden, the people expressed the will and feeling of the community. The 
audience was an active reminder to the accused of their positions as the trangressive
87minority.
85 SCG, December 27, 1773.
86 “Copy o f  a Letter From Mr. John Morris, at Charles Town, South Carolina, to his Brother, at London,” in 
Drake, ed., Tea Leaves, 342.
87 Rhys Isaac, “Dramatizing the Ideology o f  Revolution: Popular Mobilization in Virginia, 1774 to 1776,” 
WMQ 33 (July 1976), 362.
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The results of such actions transcended the cramped and tense atmosphere at the 
Exchange. Powerful officials, thousands of miles distant from the wharf where Curling’s 
vessel lay, ruminated on the town’s intransigence. From Whitehall on February 5, 1774, 
Lord Dartmouth dispatched a pithy correspondence to Bull, lauding the governor’s 
actions but also excoriating town residents for their recalcitrance. While the December 
standoff was “not equal in criminality to the Proceedings in other colonies,” the Crown 
could only consider “what passed at Charles Town” as a “most unwarrantable Insult to 
the authority of the Kingdom.”88 For the Crown, then, despite the safe removal of the tea 
and the town’s passivity in opposing its landing, residents’ actions at the Exchange were
OQ
nevertheless an all too public display of sedition.
*
Months passed before another attempt to import tea aroused the passions of 
Charlestonians to demonstrate not only their disapproval of royal policy but also their 
ability to convey such sentiments. In the summer of 1774, city residents expressed their 
sentiments boldly; in this instance not as interested bystanders, but as members of a mob 
bent on violence. Though the actions taken by the crowd in July exhibited many of the 
same qualities as those of the protestors’ at the Exchange the previous winter, the 
summer mob of 111A— the only one of its kind during the tea party era—voiced popular 
opinion in a new and violent manner, one that was more direct than the approach taken 
by the audience at the Exchange. By 1774, protest—and violence—had indeed come to 
the streets and piers of the South’s largest seaport.
88Great Britain. Public Records Office: Letter from Earl o f Dartmouth to Lieutenant Governor William 
Bull, February 24, 1774, Records o f  the British Public Records Office Relating to South Carolina, 1663- 
1782, microfilm, reel 11.
89 Ibid.
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The General Committee received word of the London merchant vessel Magna 
Charta's arrival in Charleston on July 18, 1774. Amidst reports that the vessel’s master, 
Captain Richard Maitland, had presented three chests of tea for inspection at Charleston’s 
customs office, the Committee immediately summoned Maitland to inquire whether he 
realized that such “conduct was contrary to the sense of this Colony in particular, and of 
America in General.” Maitland seemed contrite. Reportedly, Maitland had not known of 
the tea’s presence until he was already at sea and had “the leisure to look over his 
coquettes.” Indeed, for John Laurens, one of Maitland’s Charleston-based business 
partners, the captain’s gaffe was surely an honest blunder. “If I was requir’d to write 
particularly against Capt. Maitland,” Laurens related to his brother, community luminary 
Henry Laurens (then on business in England), “I could not in honour & Conscience do it, 
as It did not appear to me that he offended willfully and premeditatedly, but rather by 
accident & Inadvertancy.”90 To allay any residual tension, the captain added that he 
would reclaim the tea from the collector and “throw it into the river at his own cost” if the 
Committee deemed such actions appropriate. After a short conference, committee 
members deemed the gesture apropos, and requested that Maitland “burn the tea on the 
wharf.” Captain Maitland, it seemed, had averted public ire.91
The next day—July 19— Committeemen and city residents assembled on the 
public wharf to witness Maitland’s act of open contrition. Yet when the captain 
approached the customs collector and “tendered the duty in money,” to reclaim the tea, 
the Crown’s representative refused the exchange. The waiting Committee members
90 Letter o f  James Laurens to Henry Laurens, July 22, 1774 in Rogers, George C., Chesnutt, David R.,
Clark, Peggy J., and C. James Taylor, eds. The Papers o f  Henry Laurens, Volume Nine: April 19, 1773— 
Dec. 12, 1774 (Columbia, SC, 1981), 525-526.
91 Drayton, Memoirs, 132.
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became impatient. Quickly, they denounced the captain and appointed a second 
committee “to desire the merchants not to ship or receive any goods in any bottom, 
wherein Captain Maitland was, or should be concerned.” However, this measure— 
tantamount to blackballing the captain—did not satisfy the many restive Charlestonians 
who had gathered along the pier to witness Maitland’s come-uppance. As word of 
Maitland’s failure to make public amends spread, many onlookers, especially the “folks 
call’d Patriots” became “much incensed.”
Maitland was by then understandably eager to set sail for London. His attempt to 
assuage his accusers had (due to the dutifulness of Charleston’s royal officials) failed, 
and now his ship and crew lay helpless at anchor in what had become an unfriendly port. 
A royal official had even warned the captain of possible mob stirrings. Before he retired 
to his quarters, then, the master alerted the night watch aboard the Magna Charta. While 
such information provided Maitland and his crew with a chance to pass the night 
unharmed, the men were tense, and the captain readied a launch in case their situation 
aboard the docked ship became untenable.92 There, in the summer night, while he and his 
crew watched the long pier and listened for the “great threats” of the rabble, Maitland 
may have wondered how such a dire situation had arisen.93 After all, Maitland was a 
veteran of the city’s maritime trade, had developed lasting commercial relationships with 
the city’s most prominent merchants, and had been accustomed to the gracious “Civility” 
of the port’s residents. Assuredly, he had disobeyed (but unknowingly!) nonimportation 
measures when he had reported his tea at Charleston’s royal customs’ house, and the
92 Drayton, Memoirs, 135.
93 Great Britain. Public Records Office: Lieutenant Governor William Bull to Earl o f  Dartmouth, July 31, 
1774, Records o f  the British Public Records Office Relating to South Carolina, 1663-1782, microfilm, reel 
11.
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tea’s presence was due to his negligence at the voyage’s outset, when he had failed to 
thoroughly examine his cargoes. But he had already endured the harangue of the General 
Committee and the merchants’ efforts to sever his local business connections, and, was 
“not very desirous of receiving [a] visit” from angry city residents. But the “Protestors,” 
according to Maitland’s source, were nevertheless in a state of “great agitation,” and 
captain and crew could only warily watch the waterfront for signs of trouble.
They did not wait long. Before midnight, “several hundred men” crowded the 
section of the pier nearest the Magna Charta and “intended to la[y] hands” upon the 
vessel’s master.94 The captain panicked. Forsaking his crew, Maitland boarded the 
awaiting launch and ferried himself to the HMS Glasgow, anchored in Rebellion Roads, 
barely escaping the mob, which “went on board with their tar, feathers, and &tc, to 
execute vengeance on the Captain.” In an instant, Charleston’s only tea party wherein 
protestors were bent on violence came to an unremarkable end. For contemporaries, 
however, the mob’s lack of violence did nothing to temper its radical character or grave 
potential. Indeed, the flighty Maitland had been fortunate to escape. “It was impossible 
to tell,” penned one observer, “what might have been the consequence, had [the mob] 
found him.”95 If the mob damaged the ship or harmed the crew after the captain’s escape, 
however, no contemporary chronicler deemed it sufficiently noteworthy to recount. 
Maitland, it seemed, had been the only target of the crowd’s ire.
The captain escaped, but the mob had certainly acquainted him with Charleston’s 
preferred mode of public demonstration. Captain Maitland was not the first British 




locals lauded the crowd action. John Laurens decried such “outrageous measures.” 
While he did blame Maitland for his “Impudence” and foolish tendency to “rattl[e] 
disrespectfully of some folks,” he hoped that “the most judicious and more Moderate 
part” of the community would scorn the mob. But by his own admission, Laurens was a 
distant observer of events in the streets and on the docks of Charleston in late July 1774. 
His capricious “Humours” had “confine[d] him at home” to sickbed, far from the buzz of 
an “incens’d” protestors.
*
More than a year elapsed between Captain Curling’s initial stirring of 
Charleston’s non-importation sentiments and the November 1774 arrival of Captain 
Samuel Ball—another veteran merchant mariner accustomed to the long voyage between 
the mother country and colonies— and his vessel Britannia. Much had remained more or 
less constant in Charleston during those months, especially the manifestation of an at 
least ostensible devotion to the tenets of non-importation by the town’s popular forces. 
And indeed, the circumstances that confronted Captain Ball upon his arrival at Charleston 
in the final days of November smacked unmistakably of the tea parties of the previous 
summer and December 1773. But, as Captain Ball’s preemptive apology would make 
plain, the third tea party was more than just another crowd bullying a few importers and 
ship captains: the events of November 1774 revealed, in fact, the extent to which 
Charleston’s non-importation leanings had transcended the local sphere. The third tea 
party displayed both the sustained tenor and now international reputation of Charleston’s 
de facto authorities.
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For Samuel Ball, the crisis that jeopardized the safety of his crew and cargo upon 
arrival in Charleston began before the vessel’s departure from London. As the captain 
prepared to “clear out” and set sail westward across the Atlantic Ocean, a crewman 
informed the captain that “his Mate” had accepted two small cargoes of tea from the 
London merchant houses Ross and Mill and James Graham and Company. Despite the 
inconsiderable amount of tea aboard—only seven cases in all—the captain foresaw the 
hostile sentiments that the “mischievous drug” would arouse in Charleston. For the next 
two days, Ball delayed the Britannia's departure while he attempted to unload the illegal 
cargo. His efforts, however, proved “ineffectual.” Ball’s inability to rid the vessel of 
contraband forced him to adopt a hastily conceived contingency plan—a written protest. 
On August 29, 1774, Ball rowed ashore and professed his prior ignorance of the tea’s 
presence to a notary public in Surry. When the Britannia arrived in Charleston on 
November 1, Captain Ball had only his word to protect him.96
The city responded as the prescient Ball had anticipated. After only “Hours in 
Port,” and with help from a “Number of Young Gentlemen from the different schools,”— 
trade apprentices, most likely—word o f Ball’s cargo percolated throughout the town. 
Peter Timothy’s Gazette deemed “the mind of the People . . .  to be very much agitated.”97 
The Committee of Observation quickly relayed word of Ball’s arrival to the General 
Committee, and after a hastily convened meeting “early on Wednesday morning,”
96 SCG, November 21, 1774. The petition, witnessed by David Ewart, notary public in Surry, read: “On 
the 29th Day o f August, 1774, Before me, David Ewart, Notary-Public, dwelling in London, personally 
appeared Samuel Ball, jun. Master o f the ship Britannia, that cleared out from London for Charles-Town, 
South-Carolina, and requested me, Notary, to protest, as, by these Presents, I do protest, against the 
shippers o f Three Half-Chests and Four Quarter Chests o f TEA, by the said Ship, without the Knowledge 
or Consent o f him appears, or any applications in him in Respect thereof—Witness my Notorial Firm and 
Seal, the Day and Year above-written.” Ibid.
97 Ibid. Before Ball’s arrival, the “Gentlemen”— most likely local apprentices— had not lacked for activity. 
Earlier that day, they had gone door-to-door throughout the town in an attempt to confiscate aiiy tea 
possessed by local families. They had found all “Houses without any.” Ibid.
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summoned the Britannia's master to appear at the Exchange. Ball assented to the request 
and came to the Exchange, hat-in-hands. Members of the Committee acted their part, 
expressing “Concern and Astonishment” at Ball’s conduct. But Ball was prepared for the 
browbeating, and presented his “Protest” in hopes that the document would “acquit him 
from the Suspicion of having any Design to act contrary to the Sense of the People [in 
Charleston] of the Voices of America.”98 The captain readily admitted to possessing the 
tea, but disavowed any intention of knowingly shipping the cargo to Charleston. Bull’s 
affidavit proved efficacious. But urgent business remained: as the Committee dismissed 
Ball, it summoned local merchants Robert Mackenzie, Zephamiah Kinsley, and Robert 
Lindsay, to whom the tea had been consigned, to appear that evening at a public meeting 
of the General Committee at the Exchange.
The “Importers of the Tea” arrived at a “very full” Exchange that evening. Like 
their fellow merchants Roger Smith, Peter Leger, and William Greenwood, who had 
quickly reversed their positions on nonimportation in December 1773, these latest targets 
o f public ire “declared that they were willing to do any Thing . . .  to preserve the Peace 
and Quiet of the Community.” The charged atmosphere at the Exchange had once again
99proven quite persuasive.
At noon on November 3, the guilty importers ferried out to Ball’s Britannia. In 
the presence of the Committee of Observation and within “View of the General 
Concourse of People,” Mackenzie, Kinsley, and Lindsay, “with their own hands 
respectively stove the chests belonging to each, and emptied their Contents into the 




Cheers” and “separated as if nothing had happened.” The crowd remained peaceful. The 
merchants had disposed of their own tea. Once again, a tea party in restive Charleston 
had ended without incident, but not without significance.100
The actions of the protestors during Charleston’s final tea party of November 3, 
1774, were much more akin to the events o f December 1773 than to the crowd’s intended 
treatment of Captain Maitland in July 1774. Indeed, protests were non-violent. The 
public’s intimidation of the violators of nonimportation agreements, however, was baldly 
apparent. Indeed, the third tea party was not just another display of a discontented public 
and humbled, cowed importers. The preemptive actions taken by the implicated English 
merchant captain spoke to Charleston’s newly garnered reputation as an anti-import 
hotbed, while the party’s symbolic conclusion clearly displayed the general public as 
arbiter o f extralegal justice.
By the end of 1774, Charleston’s extralegal crowds— staid and stolid audiences or 
vehement mobs—had garnered enhanced extralegal authority through their roles in 
Charleston’s tea parties. Their means were effective; their sentiments had garnered a 
transatlantic reputation. Historians must not discount these “moments of equality” 
where, members of Charleston’s crowds undertook what they deemed meaningful public 
action on behalf of their community. Such influence, however, was undoubtedly fleeting. 
The crowd’s power was temporary. Indeed, though Charleston’s protestors helped 
dispense public authority in 1773 and 1774, a correspondent amelioration in station or 
influence for most of the “gentlemen of the schools” who supposedly comprised the 
crowds was not forthcoming. Though the tea parties empowered participants in the short 
term, most individual protestors failed—or did not desire—to parlay their temporary
100 Steedman, “Charlestown’s Forgotten Tea Party,” 247-251; SCG, November 21, 1774.
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extralegal influence into lasting gains within Charleston’s established sociopolitical 
orthodoxy. While the initial phase of popular empowerment in Charleston, then, allowed 
the journeymen and others in the crowds a public voice, most mechanics did not make 
demonstrable political gains during the tea party era. Only later in the revolutionary era 




The Limits of Change
The general meetings and mob of 1773 and 1774 that comprised the first phase of 
the tea party era brought a semblance of public authority to all protestors. Historians 
have noted this shift toward popular power. In his narrative of the first tea party and the 
subsequent “meeting of the inhabitants” at the Exchange Building in December 1773, 
George Rogers purported to have identified an “important milestone—perhaps even a 
starting point” in the “search to discover the voice o f the people” of revolutionary South 
Carolina.101 Richard Walsh’s thorough analysis of the city’s artisan population in the 
middle and late eighteenth century affirmed that, at least for some mechanics, the 
immediate pre-Revolutionary period was an epoch of political gain. Indeed, the 
argument that the tumult of the times allowed some politically anonymous citizens a 
more prominent voice in the local public and political arenas is somewhat plausible. Tea 
party protestors wielded a considerable amount of public authority, and, by their actions, 
defined themselves as concerned and proactive citizens. The empowering effect of this 
civic awareness upon individuals was considerable. Nevertheless, the gains made by the 
“gentlemen of the schools” during this first phase of popular agitation did little to alter 
Charleston’s sociopolitical order.
101 Charles C. Rogers, “The Charleston Tea Party: The Significance o f December 3, 1773,” South Carolina 
Historical Magazine 75 (July 1974), 153.
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The second phase of popular empowerment, however, effected more permanent 
changes in local political culture, as affluent mechanics ascended to leadership positions 
in the de facto assemblies that came to be Charleston’s ruling political bodies after the tea 
parties. The General Committee, the unofficial legislative body that corresponded with 
similar committees throughout the colonies at the height of the non-importation era, 
claimed fifteen mechanics as members, along with an equal number of merchants and 
sixty-nine planters.102 Thirteen artisans became members of the First Provincial 
Congress, which, upon its creation by. the General Committee in 1774, “gradually
i massumed the legislative powers of the Province.” In these instances, some artisans, 
whose profession and social place— despite their economic worth—had precluded them 
from authentic participation in local politics before 1773, became elected leaders of the 
community.
Prosopographic information is extant for nearly half of the artisans who held 
positions on Charleston’s General Committee, First Provincial Congress, or both.104 The 
documents that relate such enticing clues—estate inventories, slave and ship registers, to 
name but a few—offer, o f course, only snapshots of an individual’s life. The exact 
financial standing of each of the mechanics who gained committee or congressional 
membership at the moment of election is perhaps unattainable. Nevertheless, there 
remains evidence—a sufficient number of snapshots—to arrive at a preliminary 
conclusion regarding the artisans who came to power in the late pre-Revolutionary era:
102 Walsh, Charleston’s Sons o f  Liberty, 64.
103 Ibid., 65.
104 Slave ownership records, ship registrations, and estate inventories are available for nine mechanic 
members o f the General Committee and First Provincial Congress. Since Daniel Cannon, Peter Timothy, 
and Edward Weyman held both posts, information is thus available for twelve o f  a possible twenty-eight 
officeholders.
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Charleston’s officeholding mechanics of 1773 and 1774 were all artisans of high 
economic status.
All artisan members of either the General Committee or First Provincial Congress 
for whom estate information is available held much greater material assets than other, 
non-officeholding artisans. To be sure, these master craftsmen-come- politicians were 
not all economic peers. Some, like William Johnson and Cato Ash, owned massive 
estates that dwarfed the holdings o f other elected committeemen and congressmen, 
including even some merchants and planters.105 Johnson and Ash were two of the 
wealthiest men in the city, each claiming estates worth well over £25,000 sterling. 
Officials like Daniel Cannon and Simon Berwick were of more modest economic means, 
but wealthy nevertheless, each with holdings of more than £5,000 sterling.106 A third 
economic tier within the elected artisan contingent, one to which the majority of 
committee members and congressmen belonged, is perhaps most germane to the current 
study. These artisans—five in all—were, compared with Johnson, Ash, or even Cannon, 
not rich men.107 Their median estate worth of £464 sterling, however, was still more than
1 Oftquadruple the holdings of most Charleston mechanics. While a great monetary divide 
separated the wealthiest artisan committee members and congressmen from elected 
artisans of this tertiary and lowest state, the holdings of even the most humble elected 
mechanic dwarfed those of who remained politically muted. Most of Charleston’s
105 Ash’s estate worth at the time o f  his death during the Revolution was £23,441 sterling. Johnson, who 
lived well into the nineteenth century but had prospered during the eighteenth, died with an estate worth 
$79,533.
106 At the time o f his death, Cannon was a substantial area creditor. Charlestonians owed him £5,891. 
Berwick’s assets totaled £5,085.
107 Include first names: Matthew Morris, £509; Edward Trusler, £645; Edward Weyman, £385; Michael 
Kaltieson, £381; Peter Timothy, £400.
108 Main estimated the median holdings o f  Charleston’s mechanics to be approximately £110 sterling.
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mechanics, then, shared their trades with artisan members o f the General Committee and 
First Provincial Congress, but little else—and certainly not common economic straits.
William Johnson, blacksmith and member of the General Committee, most 
glaringly exemplified the gaping economic gap between Charleston’s elected and non- 
officeholding craftsmen. Upon his death in 1818, Johnson’s diverse financial portfolio—- 
valued at more than $79,000—included extensive land, human, material, and stock 
assets.109 Aside from his house in St. Phillip’s Parish, Johnson had also purchased a 
plantation in the rural parish of Grove-Creek. A substantial slaveowner, Johnson’s 
human chattel—from “blacksmith negroes” in Charleston, valued at over five hundred 
dollars each, to “prime” and “inferior” fieldhands on his plantation—comprised nearly 
half of his fortune. The worth of his rich mahogany dressers and tea tables alone dwarfed 
the average estate worth of lesser artisans. A schooner, anchored in Charleston Harbor, 
and a carriage and horses only accentuated the atypical financial standing of this 
Charleston blacksmith.
Nor was Daniel Cannon—a member of both the General Committee and First 
Provincial Congress—in any way an artisan of ordinary means. As the “most influential 
mechanic in Charleston,” the house-carpenter known familiarly as “Daddy Cannon” sat 
firmly atop the pinnacle o f the vertical artisan social strata of pre-Revolutionary 
Charleston. His assets—real and liquid—possessed in life and left to his progeny after 
death spoke to the man’s material worth. After the Revolution, the first United States 
Census listed Cannon as a considerable slaveholder, possessing thirty-one human chattel. 
Upon his death in 1816, the founder of Cannonsborough was even the primary creditor of
109 Cannon’s value in pounds Sterling was approximately £ 18,400. John J. McCusker, How Much is That 
Worth in real Money? A Historical Commodity Price Index fo r  use as a Deflator o f Money Values in the 
Economy o f  the United States (Worcester, MA, 2001), 34.
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many Charlestonians, who owed him sums ranging from forty to two thousand dollars. 
Even before the Revolution, however, Cannon had prospered. In 1765, local shipwrights 
completed construction of the Cannon, a twenty-five ton schooner that expanded its 
owner’s commercial role from producer to conveyor of goods. Cannon bridged the often- 
gaping breech between mechanic and merchant interests; his vessel, anchored in 
Charleston Harbor, attested to his considerable worth.
Though Johnson and Cannon were glaring examples of the economic disparity 
between artisans o f Charleston’s unofficial legislative bodies and those who remained 
politically anonymous, they were by no means the only council members or congressmen 
who embodied this disparity. One glance inside the residence of provincial congressman 
Mark Morris, in fact, announced this disparity much more clearly than figures of net 
worth or stock holdings on an estate inventory. Though not at all a financial peer of 
either Johnson or Cannon, Morris adorned the front room of his home with tables and 
desks of mahogany, tea stands, and chests. Framed prints hung on the wall. He 
displayed sets of chinaware in his backroom, which doubled as his library, and contained 
the congressman’s numerous volumes. Nor was Morris bereft of human property. His 
slaves—Isaac, John, Prince, and David—were all skilled carpenters, bricklayers, and 
painters, and accounted for one half of Morris’s estate worth of £585, more than five 
times the average worth o f most other Charleston artisans.
Likewise, though also worth much less than either Johnson or Cannon, 
upholsterer Edward Weyman’s economic (and thus social) position within Charleston’s 
artisan community also allowed him to prosper from the partial democratization of the 
city’s politics in the immediate pre-Revolutionary era. A substantial property holder,
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Weyman, despite his stance as a “zealous whig,” indulged in the fineries and baubles that 
distanced him from less affluent artisans, and had, by his death in 1783, amassed an 
estate worth nearly £400. The mahogany tables, twenty-two chairs, library of books, and 
backgammon table that adorned his home clearly distinguished Weyman as a man of 
taste and worth. A slaveowner and wartime confidant of city patriarch William H. 
Drayton, Weyman’s status and social connections earmarked the affluent mechanic as a 
spokesman for the mechanic community, as was evidenced by his election to the 
Provincial Congress in 1774.
By contrast, the decorative tastes and estate values of Charleston’s less successful 
artisans are much more difficult to trace. Available evidence, however, suggests that 
artisans who occupied more modest economic straits than their elected betters not only 
failed to reap the fruits of a widened political sphere in the late pre-Revolutionary era but 
also continued to deal with pressing financial crises throughout the early national period. 
While wealthy artisans reaped real political gains in the aftermath of the tea parties, those 
who did not—the majority of Charleston’s mechanics, in fact—experienced little political 
empowerment and dealt with discouraging economic conditions and a grave struggle for 
professional viability.
As was the case before the tea party era, economic competition from enslaved 
black labor depressed the power of artisan labor well into the early national era. 
Throughout the immediate post-Revolutionary period, mechanics’ groups peppered the 
state legislature with petitions to redress their economic grievances. These petitions— 
aside from their immediate purpose of ameliorating the mechanics’ impaired position 
within the local economy— were, in fact, resolute policy statements by men who
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otherwise tread quite softly through the historical record. In 1783, the Master House- 
Carpenters and Bricklayers implored the assembly to rid the streets of “jobbing Negroe 
tradesmen,” who precluded white artisans from profit by accepting assignments “for very 
little more than the Materials would cost.”110 The master-carpenters and bricklayers 
begged for the enforcement of earlier legislation that had strictly prohibited “negroes 
from undertaking work on their own Account.”111 One decade later, the city’s master 
coopers decried the same debilitating effects of slave labor on the economic prospects of 
white artisans. Convinced that the latitude afforded slave craftsmen to “self-traffick” 
caused “great and manifest Injury” to the “mechanical part of the Community,” the 
coopers—much like the carpenters ten years earlier—beseeched the assembly to restrict
119contracted slave labor. Decades after Charleston’s tea parties, then, the popular 
empowerment of the immediate pre-Revolutionary era had brought little socioeconomic 
amelioration to Charleston’s artisans who struggled to remain competitive in the local 
economy.
While a few artisans, then, rode the popularizing currents of the pre- 
Revolutionary period to unprecedented political heights, most failed to reap real and 
tangible benefits. For every Daniel Cannon, whose newly found political clout only 
supplemented an already assured economic security as one of the city’s most 
accomplished artisans, there were others who struggled not for political accolade but for 
basic economic well-being. This divergence of artisan experience in the tea parties’ wake 
presents in fine relief not only the limited sociopolitical gains of the era but also the
110 “Petition o f the Master Coopers’ Society, 1793,” Item 64, Microfilm Roll ST 1367, Drawer 104, South 
Carolina Department o f  Archives and History, Columbia, SC.
111 Ibid.
112 “Petition o f the House-Carpenters and Bricklayers o f Charleston, 1783,” Item 159, Microfilm Roll ST 
1360, Drawer 104, South Carolina Department o f Archives and History, Columbia, SC.
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extent to which internal, socioeconomic stratifications parsed members of the mechanic 




Popular empowerment came to pre-Revolutionary Charleston in the same manner 
in which the tea had left: by waves. It radiated outward from the events of the tea party 
era and brought public authority to protestors, and later, specific political gains to 
wealthy tradesmen. In two waves, popular participation empowered Charleston’s many, 
and, subsequently, its few. The first phase of this “out of doors” movement was, in its 
own way, no less substantial than the latter period of concrete political gain. That later 
artisans gained political legitimacy by their participation in legislative bodies like the 
General Council or Provincial Congress did not lessen the importance of the initial and 
broader empowerment of Charlestonians in the street. The men, women, and perhaps 
even children who mobbed sea captains and shamed city merchants must have perceived 
their authority—felt it, even. But for most, this initial public authority did not transform 
into eventual and tangible political gain.
Whether most artisans even desired further political amelioration, is, of course, a 
relevant concern. They had been virtual participants for some time, and had shown little 
inclination to alter the local sociopolitical hierarchy. Whatever the answer, however, the 
fact remains that no mechanic of ordinary means became a member o f either of the city’s 
de facto legislative bodies. From local luminaries like William Johnson to the less 
wealthy but nevertheless well-to-do Edward Weyman, the artisan contingents of both the
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General Council and First Provincial Congress were enclaves of the financially secure. 
While day laborers perhaps did much of the mobbing in Charleston, none became 
councilors or congressmen.
The changes in Charleston’s political culture during the tea party era, then, were 
quite circumscribed. Assuredly, the second phase of popular empowerment allowed 
artisans to gain elected office. Though Charleston’s officeholding artisans may not have 
been bom to a social station befitting an elected official, acquired affluence compensated 
for low birth during the tea party era. Even this tangible gain, however—the puncturing 
of a strict political culture wherein membership and relevance was tied fast to birth and 
station—had definite limits. Mechanics of more ordinary economic standing could not 
hope to partake equally of the extant opportunity for political empowerment. In 
Charleston, the waves of popular empowerment broke upon the rock of socioeconomic 
difference.
As many “faces” of the Charleston mob remain hazy, so too do the motives of 
crowd participants. No single cause, it seems, moved mechanics and other 
Charlestonians to assemble and mob in favor of nonimportation in 1773 and 1774. The 
reasons why townspeople stood behind Christopher Gadsden at the Exchange in 
December 1773 or terrified Captain Maitland the next summer were complex, and did not 
always meld exactly to the interpretive dichotomies subsequently set forth by many 
“conflict” or “consensus” scholars. By 1773, assuredly, crowd members and leaders had 
both concluded that public action was an appropriate response to British transgressions; 
their actions were often well orchestrated and constrained. Yet this restraint was 
noticeably absent in July 1774. Furthermore, it seems that any protest against the
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metropole by members o f diverse socioeconomic groups within Charleston could have 
signaled a momentary unity among various interests as easily as it could some absolute 
ideological and lasting community-wide accord. British tea and all for which it stood 
hastened this coalescing of colonial interests, allowing planters, artisans, and others to 
form a united front against an external enemy. Whether the ties that bound this alliance 
that transcended socioeconomic divides were anything more than urges to defend the 
community against an external threat is subject to debate. Crowd participants, certainly, 
while perhaps sharing some reasons for mobbing or defaming a merchant mariner, may 
have held other reasons for their actions. The actors of Charleston’s tea parties arrived on 
the same historical stage by different prompts, varying cues.
Conversely, however, the actions of Charleston’s artisans cannot be immediately 
construed as direct plays for popular or political empowerment. It is incorrect to assume 
that their efforts were— originally, at least—conscious attempts at sociopolitical 
amelioration. And yet, consciously or otherwise, their participation in the tea party 
crowds afforded craftsmen a very real form of public authority in 1773 and 1774. Such 
an accomplishment did not make Charleston craftsmen unique— as Alfred Young has 
demonstrated, artisans in other cities made similar gains during the nonimportation era. 
But in Charleston, where artisans had long dealt with not only constricted political rights 
and the economic pressures caused by cheap imports, but also the debilitating effects of 
slave labor on their economic viability as wage laborers, the tea parties afforded 
mechanics a forum in which they sounded a long stifled note of socioeconomic 
frustration.
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The reasons why artisans participated in Charleston’s tea parties were, in fact, far 
too muddled to fit the parameters of any reductionist interpretive framework. Artisans 
were not required—nor were they likely—to have protested either solely for the 
betterment of the community or the amelioration of their own socioeconomic class: 
perhaps by their protests, they did both. Viewed in this light, Charleston’s artisans 
remain complex, their circumstances intricate, and their presence in the historical record 
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